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 Killer robots are no longer a facet of science fiction, but rather an imminent reality. The 
development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) has been something states and military 
operations have been working towards to build their arsenal and change the landscape of 
conflict. With this changing landscape, these AWS fit within public international law in a unique 
way, existing somewhere in between a weapon and a combatant. With increased autonomy and 
diminished human control over their behaviour, AWS present an interesting dilemma to existing 
international legal structures, as they are typically written in a fashion designed to be adhered by 
humans, not machines. In order to better understand and solidify the place of AWS within these 
structures, this paper will analyze legal scholars’ works regarding AWS in armed conflict. 
Within the defined boundaries set forth in the international regulatory legal structures, this paper 
will provide analysis situated in context in order to provide a more grounded interpretation of 
AWS within these structures. literature review seeks to draw conclusions from these authors and 
their work, and how they contribute to finding a place for AWS within the existing international 
legal structures.   
 This literature review will look at these existing legal structures, specifically the 1977 
Additional Protocol I (API) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as it broadly and holistically 
covers the norms and principles that must be adhered to in conflict. The norms and principles of 
international law set forth in the API are analyzed in terms of how AWS fit within these 
structures, identifying aspects and characteristics of the systems that would allow them to 
perform certain tasks, such as their ability to perform lawful attacks. Possible avenues for which 
AWS can be included in the clauses and definitions presented in these Conventions and 
principles are also provided, identifying that these weapons can be interpreted into these 
structures based on their autonomous system and weapons features, such as munition and 
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sensors. Specifically, the principles of discretion and proportionality are explored and the 
capabilities of AWS are analyzed as to whether they are actually able to comply with these 
principles. Components such as sensors and decision-making software are used to identify 
targets and perform proportionality calculations in order to adhere with these principles, though 
with varying levels of compliance confidence.  
 This literature review delves into the two different avenues of attributing responsibility 
for the actions of AWS. One option is the developers of the AWS, who designed and 
programmed the system with set parameters and code that determines its decision-making and 
action capabilities. More specifically, these developers ultimately determine how the AWS will 
perform its tasks, and therefore vicariously contribute to the acts it commits. However, these 
developers are also too far removed from the acts and their creation, and some aspects of the 
autonomous features diminish the influence of the developers over the AWS’s behaviour. 
Another option for attributing responsibility is the military commander who deployed the 
weapon and has command responsibility over the AWS. Since the decision is deliberate on the 
part of the military commanders to ultimately deploy the AWS, they must be responsible for 
their actions on the battlefield, and should take all reasonable steps to ensure the AWS is in the 
best state to perform its military objectives.  
WHERE DO THEY FIT? EXPLORING AWS’S PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
It is important to understand the current landscape of international law, which provides 
the foundation for interpreting how AWS fit within these existing structures. International law 
exists in four branches: the law of state responsibility, the law on the use of force, international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law.1 This section of this paper will focus primarily on 
                                                 
1 Denise Garcia, "Killer Robots: Why the US should Lead the Ban," Global Policy Volume 6, Issue 1 (2015): 60. 
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the law on the use of force, or law of armed conflict (LOAC), and IHL. International law 
concerning conduct in war focuses on human soldiers and their use of weapons and other force.2 
In other words, much of the language coded in the current international legal structures focuses 
on characteristics such as reasonability and common sense, which are traditionally associated as 
innately human characteristics and therefore create a difficulty in translating them for an AWS. 
Currently, there are no laws or treaties that explicitly provide governance on AWS, but rather 
regarding use of force and weapons as a whole.3 Aspects of AWS are covered within existing 
legislation that deal with the projection of force, specific technologies and practices, and 
interpretations of IHL and principles of the LOAC.4 For example, the principle of distinction – 
which will be discussed in length later in this section – requires that combatants distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military 
objectives, and thus only attack military objectives.5 Therefore, a weapon such the US Air 
Force’s Low Cost Autonomous Attack system, which is capable of searching for and identifying 
targets, is capable of complying with this principle as it is capable of identifying a military 
target.6 Thus, although AWS are not explicitly named in this principle, there is still the 
possibility of interpreting the law to match with the capabilities of an AWS.  
Another aspect of international law is the concept of good governance. Good governance 
has been described by Gary Marchant et al. – who are members of the Autonomous Robotics 
group of the Consortium on Emerging Technologies, Military Operations, and National Security, 
and individually conduct research in legal and robotic ethics – as realistic, holistic, inclusive, 
                                                 
2 Gary E. Marchant, Braden Allenby, Ronald Arkin and Edward T. Barrett, "International Governance of 
Autonomous Military Robots," Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 12 (2011): 289. 
3 Ibid, 289. 
4 Ibid, 289.  
5 Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, "Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of 
Armed Conflict," Harvard National Security Journal 4, no. 2 (2013): 251. 
6 Robert Sparrow, "Killer Robots," Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2007): 63.  
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feasible and malleable norms that can be accomplished under existing policy and legal 
constraints, and therefore can be assessed and improved upon when necessary.7 In other words, 
good governance is not codified, but rather is a set of agreed upon norms that states can use 
when conducting operations, and it is understood that other states will adhere to these norms as 
well. Since they are not codified, states are able to re-evaluate and change these norms where 
necessary, for example the introduction of new technologies or new conflict environments. Good 
governance is a self-regulatory concept in which states hold each other accountable to a certain 
level of behaviour. Bode Ingvild and Henrick Huelss specialize in international politics and 
relations, and define norms as “standards of appropriateness for specific practices,” allowing for 
broad guiding principles for states to adhere to.8 In other words, the fundamental and procedural 
norms set out in existing principles of international law shape how states will act and provide 
standards for “appropriate” warfare.9 As broad principles, they allow for a wider range of 
interpretations and scenarios in which they can be deemed applicable. Therefore, the malleability 
and self-regulatory nature of good governance allows for states to adapt to new technologies, 
such as AWS, and create new standards that are more inclusive of these developments as they 
happen.  
IHL presents key legal steps when conducting an attack, which provides states and 
military commanders with a standardized approach to warfare. Alan Blackstrom and Ian 
Henderson summarize these steps as: collective information about a target; analyzing said 
information in order to determine the lawfulness of the target at the time of the attack; 
understanding the potential incidental effects of the weapon and taking precautions to minimize 
                                                 
7 Marchant et al., 2011: 291.  
8 Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss, "Autonomous weapons systems and changing norms in international relations," 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 44 (2018): 407. 
9 Ibid, 407-408.  
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them; assessing the proportionality of those effects against the anticipated military advantage of 
the attack; firing the weapon at the directed target; and monitoring the situation in order to cancel 
or suspend the attack if necessary.10 In other words, in order for an attack to be considered 
lawful, it must adhere to the principles of distinction and proportionality, have collected all 
necessary information to have an exhaustive and conclusive understanding of the environment in 
which the attack will be made, and employ mitigation strategies in case an attack goes array. 
This list of relatively simple tasks becomes far more complicated with AWS, as the more 
complex a weapon is, the greater the potential is for discrimination to be affected by design 
errors or manufacturing errors.11 This creates issues in anticipating the actions of these AWS and 
ensuring their compliance with these norms. If we are unable to anticipate the actions of an 
AWS, we are unable to reasonably have all the information necessary to ensure a lawful attack, 
as well as be confident that the AWS will be able to accurately calculate the proportionality of 
the attack before firing, or suspend or cancel their attack if necessary.  
In order to ensure greater confidence that AWS will be able to conduct a lawful attack, it 
may be necessary to have safeguards in place to intervene and ensure effective compliance if the 
AWS itself cannot confidently do so. It is important, therefore, to have what Geoffrey Corn calls 
LOAC compliance enablers.12 These can include military commanders and programmers who 
can ensure that the weapon has the capability to follow those key legal steps.13 This approach has 
been used when issuing orders to subordinate units; for example, a unit of soldiers is told by their 
                                                 
10 Alan Blackstrom and Ian Henderson, "New capabilities in warfare: an overview of contemporary technological 
developments and the associated legal and engineering issues in Article 36 weapons reviews," International Review 
of the Red Cross 94, no. 886 (2012): 485. 
11 Ibid, 486.  
12 Geoffrey S. Corn, "Autonomous weapons systems: managing the inevitability of 'taking the man out of the loop,'" 
In Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy, ed. Nehal C. Bhuta et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2016): 
224. 
13 Ibid, 224. 
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commanding officer what their task is and the purpose of that task.14 Therefore, Geoffrey Corn 
translates this idea to AWS, demonstrating how maximizing the articulation of this “task and 
purpose” within the intended tactical function of the AWS will facilitate compliance with the 
LOAC.15 In other words, Corn argues that by having the developer program the AWS with 
certain functions capable of objectives while adhering to principles such as distinction and 
proportionality, and by having the military commander deploy the AWS within specific 
parameters into attack and monitoring its actions, this will create more confidence in the AWS’s 
ability to comply with the LOAC. Corn additionally argues that this increased oversight of the 
development of AWS allows for better assessments of the potential risk of LOAC violation, 
which in turn will help define the weapon’s purpose and intended use; therefore, the 
development phase of AWS is decisive in establishing LOAC compliance confidence.16 By 
being more involved in the development of the AWS, officials are able to determine the 
capabilities of the AWS and therefore determine how and where it should be used to maximize 
confidence of LOAC compliance.  
In terms of concrete codified law, the 1977 Additional Protocol I (API) to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions provides a comprehensive outline for weapons law and LOAC. Article 36 
of the API has required that a High Contracting Party is under obligation to determine whether a 
new weapon, means or method of warfare that it is developing or acquiring may be prohibited by 
the Protocol or any other rule of international law that the High Contracting Party is party to.17 
This links to Corn’s argument, that it is important for States to have oversight over the 
development of a new weapon, such as an AWS, to ensure that its functionality is capable of 
                                                 
14 Ibid, 224-225.  
15 Ibid, 225.  
16 Ibid, 225-228.  
17 Ibid, 227.  
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complying with the LOAC. Additionally, under this article, it is required of states that are party 
to this API to conduct legal reviews of all weapons being developed to ensure they meet the 
requirements laid out in the API.18 These reviews are self-regulatory, rooted mainly in customary 
international law and norms. Article 38 is considered to embody the customary law of obligation 
regarding weapons and therefore acts as a starting point for understanding weapons law.19 It 
includes a wide range of weapons and how they should be used, which can be considered 
unlawful in itself or unlawful in the way that it is used in certain circumstances only.20 This 
provides a very broad approach to understanding and governing weapons. Article 51(4)(c) of the 
API also details that weapons systems that have uncontrollable effects, despite being able to 
strike their targets accurately, are not allowed.21 Article 50(1) deals with more “human” aspects 
of conflict, specifically looking at doubt and its role during an attack.22 Article 50(1) explains 
that “doubt as to status of a person must be resolved in favour of treating that individual as a 
civilian” during an attack.23 This threshold for doubt is, however, framed in terms of human 
reasonableness, and therefore complicates translation for AWS.24 This is not to say that it cannot 
be done; algorithms that can precisely measure doubt and reliability of target identification can 
mitigate this issue, providing these systems with all the information necessarily to act as if they 
were a reasonable human attacker.25  
                                                 
18 Ibid, 28.  
19 Hin-Yan Liu, "Categorization and legality of autonomous and remote weapons systems," International Review of 
the Red Cross 94, no. 886 (Summer 2012): 638. 
20 Ibid, 639.  
21 Michael N. Schmitt, “Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian law: a reply to the critics,” 
Harvard National Security Journal, 4 (2013): 14.  
22 Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 262.  
23 Ibid, 262.  
24 Ibid, 263.  
25 Ibid, 263.  
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Ultimately, a main concern when determining whether AWS will ever be able to conduct 
themselves in the nuanced way necessary to comply with international law rests in the two key 
principles of international LOAC: distinction and proportionality. The two substantive rules 
within the API are codified in Article 54(b)(4) and Article 35(2).26 These two rules determine the 
lawfulness of the weapons themselves; the first stating that a weapon is deemed indiscriminate if 
it cannot be aimed at a specific target, and the second stating that a weapon is deemed 
disproportionate if its nature is to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury to 
combatants.27 It is important, therefore, to delve further into these principles and examine 
whether AWS have the capabilities to comply with them in order to better understand their place 
within the legal landscape.  
Distinction 
Distinction, also referred to as discrimination, is a crucial element of international law 
which protects civilians and civilian objects. This principle is codified in law through Article 48 
of the API, stating that: “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population 
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”28 This means that states have an 
obligation to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, and military targets from civilian 
objects, in order to protect civilians and ensure that they are only attacking targets that fulfill 
their military objective. Civilian objects are those that  are “indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population,” as well as the natural environment, historic monuments, places of worship 
                                                 
26 Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, "Law and ethics for autonomous weapon systems: why a ban won’t 
work and how the laws of war can," Hoover Institution, Stanford University (2013): 10. 
27 Ibid, 10. 
28 Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 251.  
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and works of art.29 Additionally, distinction requires that attacks be limited to military objectives, 
and defines a military objective as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture 
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”30 
There is little difference between the application of these rules governing attacks on individuals 
and objects, but ultimately AWS that lack the capability to distinguish between lawful and 
unlawful targets may be considered illegal under the Protocol.31 There are AWS that have been 
developed with this capability; for example, the South Korean military developed a stationary 
sentry robot that is capable of detecting and selecting targets, as well as respond with lethal or 
non-lethal force depending on the circumstances at the time, without human input.32 
Additionally, the Phalanx Close In Weapons Systems for Aegis class cruisers in the US Navy are 
capable of autonomously conducting their own searches, detection, evaluation, tracking and 
killing of targets.33 Therefore, in order for an AWS to be considered discriminatory in nature, it 
must have the ability to distinguish its target from non-targets, and aim in a way that only attacks 
that target. It must also have the ability to actively survey its area and make distinctions 
throughout the course of its military operation.   
Distinction is not always black and white in terms of identifying civilian and military 
objects. Distinguishing between military and non-military objects becomes more difficult with 
the labelling of targets as “suspected terrorists;” persons in this category in armed conflict are 
                                                 
29 Markus Wagner, "Autonomy in the Battlespace: Independently Operating Weapon Systems and the Law of 
Armed Conflict," In International Humanitarian Law and the Changing Technology of War vol. 41. Edited by Dan 
Saxon (Leiden, Brill: 2013): 110.  
30 David Akerson, "The Illegality of Offensive Lethal Autonomy," In International Humanitarian Law and the 
Changing Technology of War vol. 41, ed. Dan Saxon (Leiden, Brill: 2013): 77-78.  
31 Schmitt, 2013: 18. 
32 James Foy, "Autonomous Weapons Systems: Taking the Human out of International Humanitarian Law," 
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 23 (2014): 50.  
33 Ibid, 51.  
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prima facie, or at first appearance, civilians and are protected as such until they participate 
directly in the hostilities.34 Determining whether a civilian is actually directly participating in the 
conflict requires analyzing whether that participation is “direct or indirect, continuous or 
sporadic, and caused a sufficient level of harm of a military nature.”35 This, therefore, creates a 
highly subjective scenario for a soldier, or AWS, to decipher in order to apply the principle of 
distinction, and the question remains whether AWS have the capability to perform such tasks.36 
Some difficulties can also arise for the attacker in cases where they must distinguish between 
civilian and military objects when said object can be classified as both civilian and military in 
purpose.37 An example of this could be a bridge an army uses to get supplies; the bridge can be 
considered to serve a civilian purpose as it was designed for civilian commuting, but can also be 
considered to serve a military purpose as the army is using it to transport its supplies, and 
therefore aids the army in gaining supplies and building their attack. 38 Thus, the attacker must be 
able to make the decision as to whether or not it serves more of a civilian or military purpose at 
the time of the attack. The uncertainties surrounding the ability of AWS to discriminate between 
seemingly undetermined individuals to determine which are legitimate military targets and which 
are not raise some serious concerns regarding discrimination.39 This malleable identity can cause 
issues for AWS, as their software would have to be capable of constantly re-evaluating and re-
defining their targets depending on their interactions, as well as being able to identify when an 
individual is in fact participating in the conflict. Thus, there are a myriad of considerations to 
                                                 
34 Liu, 2012: 645.  
35 Akerson, 2013: 77.  
36 Ibid, 77.  
37 Markus Wagner, "Taking Humans out of the Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law," Journal of 
Law, Information and Science 21, no. 2 (2011/2012): 160. 
38 Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 160.  
39 Liu, 2012: 645.  
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make when designing an AWS to ensure that it has the capabilities to accurately comply with the 
principle of distinction.  
This principle not only details rules pertaining to the attacker, but also outlines guidelines 
for the weapons themselves. Article 51(4)(a) states that attacks that are not directed at a specific 
target and but rather strikes to lawful targets without discrimination are banned.40 This article is 
particularly important for AWS, as it is different than the ban on indiscriminate weapons because 
this ban also involves weapons that have the capability to aim at a lawful target, but do not do 
so.41 Therefore, under this Article, AWS must have and use sensors to enhance their ability to 
distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets.42 However, this becomes far more difficult the 
more complex a mission becomes. An AWS can only compute a given procedure under the 
confines in which its code was written, and therefore may not be able to sufficiently operate 
within those confines in order to properly identify what is and is not a target.43 For example, 
using the example of the “suspected terrorist” laid out above, if an AWS is not coded to be able 
to properly identify when an individual becomes directly involved in a conflict, it is unable to 
comply with the principle of distinction. This also can produce some difficulties, as the principle 
of distinction not only requires the proper distinction of legitimate and illegitimate targets, but 
also requires that an attack be carried out by weapons that have the capability to prosecute the 
attack in a discriminatory way.44 For example, an AWS must be able to attack a target without 
attacking other objects in the process; if it is the case where an AWS is in a position where it is 
unable to discriminately attack its target, it must be able to abort in order to adhere to the 
                                                 
40 Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013, 253.  
41 Ibid, 253.  
42 Ibid, 253.  
43 Noel E. Sharkey, "The inevitability of autonomous robot warfare," International Review of the Red Cross 94, no. 
886 (2012): 789. 
44 Wagner, 2011/2012, 161.  
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principle of distinction. Therefore, their underlying software would have to be sophisticated 
enough to determine whether a target it civilian or military in nature, and would have to be coded 
to take into account uncertainty and abort the attack if needed.45  
Civilians are a central focus of this principle, specifically regarding a duty of constant 
care to ensure that civilians and civilian objects are spared during conflict. This duty of constant 
care, in terms of AWS in attacks, would include the procurement of said AWS and its 
preparation for deployment, as well as the deployment and its operation in the battlefield.46 
Article 57(2)(a)(i) amplifies this by requiring that combatants “… do everything feasible to 
verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not 
subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of 
Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol of attack them 
accordingly.”47 In other words, the attacker must collect all relevant information to ensure the 
validity of their target’s identity, and that the target is in fact a military objective and not a 
civilian or civilian object. This includes preparing the mission, programming the autonomous 
software, reviewing the available information, prescribing the areas to be searched and when, 
and setting the target identification criteria for the weapon in order to ensure that it is able to 
appropriately adhere to the obligations under this Article.48 However, feasibility is very 
subjective, and invokes human judgement and discretion in order to make these decisions.49 This 
feasibility, therefore,  is ultimately an issue of reasonableness, and under the LOAC, it would 
require an attacker to assume greater risk to avoid damage if a reasonable attacker in the same or 
                                                 
45 Ibid, 161.  
46 Ibid, 87.  
47 Ibid, 80.  
48 Bill Boothby, "Weapons Law, Weapon Reviews and New Technologies," In Routledge Handbook of War, Law 
and Technology, ed. by James Gow et al. (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2019): 34.  
49 Akerson, 2013: 80.  
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similar situation would do the same. 50 With the subjectivity of this aspect of distinction, an AWS 
alone may not be able to comply, as it is not able to operate in a way that allows for reason in its 
current definition, which is inherently human-focused.  
Reasonableness and feasibility are both understood in an innately human and subjective 
way, and therefore present an obstacle for defining AWS within this principle. For example, the 
Geneva Convention cites “common sense” as a requirement for being a combatant, and thus this 
would render AWS as potentially unlawful, as machines are unable to conduct this type of 
reasoning due to their programming. 51 Noel Sharkey, a specialist in the ethics of robotics, argues 
that common sense is still necessarily for reasoning and making discrimination decisions, and 
therefore this lack of “battlefield awareness” renders AWS unable to have the independent 
facility to operate on the principles of distinction with the limited constrains in which they are 
coded.52 As common sense is grounded in rationality and reason that require a broader scope of 
decision-making, this argument follows that the constraints that are programmed into AWS 
render it incapable of having common sense and operating within this space. It would logically 
follow that in order for this “common sense” requirement to be met, an AWS must be supervised 
by a superior human operator in order to be considered compliant with the principle of 
distinction in this sense.  
Proportionality 
Proportionality works in tandem with distinction, focusing on the scale of the attack and 
its effects on civilians. This principle is codified in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) of the API, 
prohibiting: “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
                                                 
50 Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 261.  
51 Sharkey, 2012: 789.  
52 Ibid, 789.  
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civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”53 Therefore, proportionality 
requires a combatant, before attacking, to weigh the potential loss of civilian lives against the 
military advantage, and determine whether that loss would be proportional to the advantage, 
meaning that the effects would balance each other out. This proportional weighing of potential 
harm to civilians and civilian objects and the potential military advantage of the attack requires 
contextual and discretionary decision-making with emphasis on reasoning.54 However, as seen 
with distinction, reasonableness is vague and subjective, and therefore makes it difficult to 
uniformly enforce and determine, especially in terms of AWS and their capabilities.  
Regarding human combatants, the principle is considered one of the most complex and 
misunderstood norms in the law of armed conflict in terms of interpretation and application.55 
Michael Schmitt and Jeffrey Thurnher, both experts in international and military law, argue that 
this occurs because core notion of proportionality lies within the idea of “excessiveness.”56 With 
no accepted definition of excessive in the law of armed conflict, determining excessiveness is 
done on a case-by-case basis, evaluating it in terms of reasonableness within the given 
circumstances of the action.57 It therefore follows that excessiveness can be looked at through the 
idea that the greater the reasonably anticipated military advantage that might occur from the 
attack, the more the law will tolerate the expected collateral damage of said attack.58 IHL 
presents that proportionality rests on the notion that “belligerents must exercise restraint in the 
face of highly uncertain environments,” and decisions regarding proportionality should be 
                                                 
53 Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 253.  
54 Ibid, 56.  
55 Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 254. 
56 Ibid, 254.  
57 Ibid, 254.  
58 Ibid, 254.  
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weighed against dynamic environments through highly qualitative and subjective knowledge.59 
However, this becomes difficult for AWS, as their programming is constrained in terms of its 
decision-making process and is unable to process information in a qualitative and subjective 
way, and thus may not be able to make the calculations necessary to appropriately comply with 
proportionality.  
There are some ways that AWS can be designed to ameliorate their decision-making 
abilities to better comply with the principle of proportionality. Not all AWS are capable of 
proportionality; for example, landmines can be considered AWS, as the decision to detonate is 
made by the machine, but they are simply programmed to detect the intended scenario and 
detonate.60 This programming is very simple, consisting of a mechanical spring or arrangement 
that is unable to calculate proportionality.61 AWS, however, can be programmed to have pre-
determined parameters for when they can and cannot attack to adhere to proportionality.62 This 
can be done through programming “doubt values” to increase reasonableness in decision making, 
and ensure there are adequate sensors to ensure the correct identification of targets and other 
civilian individuals and objects.63 In this sense, Schmitt and Thurnher interpret reasonableness in 
terms of a calculation based in “doubt,” and the amount of doubt there is regarding a target or the 
attack’s effect. Therefore, reason becomes quantified and tangible for AWS to process and input 
into their actions. These parameters can also be set by programming relative judgement into an 
AWS, which will allow it to measure anticipated civilian harm and military advantage, subtract 
and measure the balance against a standard of “excessiveness,” and, if excessive, not attack.64 
                                                 
59 Garcia, 2015: 59.  
60 Thrishantha Nanayakkara, "Autonomy of Humans and Robots," in Routledge Handbook of War, Law and 
Technology, ed. by James Gow et al. (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2019): 136.  
61 Ibid, 136.  
62 Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 264.  
63 Ibid, 264.  
64 Anderson and Waxman, 2012: 10.  
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Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman – a scholar of international and technology law, and 
scholar of international law and LOAC, respectively –  thus turn this relative judgement into a 
concrete calculation that is weighted against a set coded standard, allowing the AWS to be able 
to make these decisions. Although this technically fails to holistically approach proportionality in 
the way that international law has traditionally expected, it provides a method for which AWS to 
adhere to the principle in their own way. Though the type of reason that has traditionally been 
linked to proportionality has relied mainly on human judgement and subjectivity, looking at 
proportionality as Schmitt and Thurnher, and Anderson and Waxman, have, makes it possible to 
understand reason in a more quantitative way, and therefore allow for an interpretation of the 
principle that fits with AWS.  
Proportionality and the concept of excess can also be viewed through the concepts of 
“superfluous injury [and] unnecessary suffering.”65 Schmitt and Thurnher note that Article 35(2), 
the article that addresses this concept, only addresses the effect of weapons systems on target 
individuals, and not the actual manner of engagement, and therefore AWS would not 
automatically violate this principle.66 This, therefore, states that AWS are able to comply with 
proportionality and causes harm that determines whether or not the effect was proportional or 
not. William Boothby, a leading authority in new weapons technologies and the development of 
international law, argues that the autonomous nature of AWS would not likely directly contribute 
to the degree of suffering or injury, but rather the munition that is being delivered to the target.67 
In other words, he argues that AWS are capable of complying with this principle so long as the 
human operator in charge of loading the weapon or choosing its munition would be responsible 
                                                 
65 Corn, 244.  
66 Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 244.  
67 Bill Boothby, "Autonomous Attack - Opportunity or Spectre?," In Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
Volume 16, ed. Terry D. Gill. (Cambridge: Springer, 2013): 75.  
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for ensuring proportionality. However, Markus Wagner, a scholar specializing in IHL and the 
technology of war, argues that AWS can be able to determine what type of effect and munition to 
use to produce an attack in any given circumstance, and understand the weighting of the effect 
on the military objective and civilian population.68 This would thus eliminate the need for human 
supervision, but would require the AWS to have the capability to calculate the proportionality of 
its attack before choosing its method. This, therefore, adds another element to the proportionality 
calculations that the AWS would need to be capable of making for itself.  
The question regarding AWS therefore is whether they are capable of performing these 
proportionality calculations properly. The decision of proportionality rests on assessing and 
processing complex data that can sometimes be based on contradictory signals if they are 
measured against a preprogrammed set of action criteria that tend to be characteristic of AWS.69 
Thus, proportionality calculations must subjectively determine the “value” of the anticipated 
military advantage gained from the attack and weigh it against the harm expected to civilians and 
civilian objects, and take precautions or ultimately forfeit the attack if there is too high of a 
degree of doubt.70 However, there still remains a level of vagueness when it comes to these 
calculations, even though they rely on pre-set parameters which make the decision-making 
process of the AWS much more stringent. Therefore, AWS do not have the capability to properly 
calculate proportionality, as their programming limits them from doing so.  
These calculations are simply not holistic or malleable enough to ensure adequate 
compliance with the principle of proportionality. Pablo Kalmanovitz argues that simply setting 
threshold values for proportionality assessments within narrow settings does not get rid of human 
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judgement, but rather makes it indispensable.71 AWS themselves are incapable of making the 
type of judgements that proportionality currently requires, even with human-made algorithms 
and choices.72 AWS also lack the reasonableness to balance the two sides of the proportionality 
calculation in a meaningful way.73 Thus, as Kalmanovitz argues, that the test of proportionality 
will ultimately rest on the human decision to deploy the AWS, assess “in good faith” and 
according to “common sense” whether the weapon is able to act proportionally given the 
algorithm and action parameters, and in the specific conditions of its deployment.74 In other 
words, a human must make the decision to deploy an AWS based on its judgement, but the AWS 
itself is still capable of acting proportionally. Therefore, though there is still a need for human 
supervision, an AWS does have the capability to calculate proportionality if the parameters of 
the military operation allow for it to do so and is not too complicated as to render the decision 
out of the scope of the programming’s decision-making capabilities.  
ROBOTS ON TRIAL: EXPLORING RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY 
 This section of the paper it will examine the different options for attributing 
responsibility for the actions of AWS. Before exploring this topic further, and exploring the 
different roles and responsibilities of the developer and military commander with regards to 
AWS, it is important to understand the definitions of responsibility and liability. Andreas 
Matthias specializes in the ethics of new technologies, and presents that an agent can only be 
held responsible if they know the particular facts that surround their action, they are able to 
freely form a decision to act, and are able to select one of the suitable available alternative 
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actions based on the facts of the given situation.75 For an AWS, as their behaviours and ability to 
make decisions are based on pre-determined code and parameters, they are unable to freely make 
decisions and do not have full control over their behaviour, which makes them unable to be held 
responsible under this definition.  
 This definition of responsibility reflects a more human-focused idea of responsibility, and 
therefore responsibility of an AWS or other technology must be defined differently. Giovanni 
Sartor and Andrea Omicini are scholars in law and artificial intelligence, and computer science 
and autonomous systems, respectively. They present three notions of responsibility concerning 
technology: functional responsibility, blameworthiness and legal liabilities for harm.76 
Functional responsibility assumes that “the harm would not have resulted had the responsible 
component correctly exercised the function attributed to it.”77 In other words, if the machine had 
been functioning correctly, specifically the component of the AWS that was caused harm to the 
object of individual, said harm would not have occurred; essentially, it is harm caused by a 
malfunction or error. This means that any component or subcomponent of the system could fail 
to exercise its expected function and therefore have harmful consequences for which the 
malfunctioning component may be considered responsible.78 For example, failure in the system’s 
sensor causes the weapon to be incapable of adhering to the principle of distinction and harms an 
innocent civilian; therefore, the failure of the sensor can be considered responsible for the AWS 
not complying with the principle of distinction and the harm caused. Blameworthiness continues 
this idea by stating that the fact that the failure that caused the harm involves a fault.79 Faulty 
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design of a weapon system could result in its inability to exercise the function that is attributed to 
it; for example, if a computer supporting an autopilot in a drone burns out due to a design failure, 
and an accident occurs, then the fault should be allocated to the developers of the computer.80 
The third notion of legal liabilities for harm can be related to a number of forms of liability, such 
as strict liability, vicarious liability, product liability and negligence.81 Under these two notions, 
responsibility can also be attributed to the humans who work on and with the AWS, such as the 
developers who design the weapons and military commanders who deploy them, and not just the 
functional aspects of the weapon itself.  
Criminal and international law recognizes this notion of shared responsibility, and allows 
agents associated with the performance and actions of an AWS to be considered responsible for 
its actions. Neha Jain is a legal scholar who specializes in public international law, and explores 
how criminal law recognizes that there are instances in which responsibility can be shared, as the 
immediate agent who is most directly related to the offence is “autonomous” in the material 
sense, but another agent can still be held responsible for their conduct.82 In other words, even 
though the agent who committed the act did so of their own ability, another agent could still be 
responsible for those actions based on their relationship with the immediate agent, such as the 
one who commanded the attack. She explains that criminal and civil law systems recognize that 
there are various categories of perpetration and principal responsibility.83 Most consistently in 
these systems, a person is considered a principal through personal fulfillment of both the action 
(actus reus) and the intent (mens rea), but some systems recognize that principal responsibility 
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can come even when the accused acts “through” another.84 For example, a military commander 
acting “through” his soldiers, since he was the one to deploy the troops and give them the 
military operation.  
There are two concepts that help give guidance for how to attribute responsibility. One 
concept is the “innocent agent”, who is an individual whose actions are not deemed “free, 
informed or voluntary” due to factors such as ignorance, insanity or minority, which in turn can 
be regarded as having been “caused” by the conduct of another person.85 AWS can, thus, be 
considered an innocent agent, as their actions are not free or voluntary due to the nature of their 
behaviour being pre-determined by another person. They also present the idea of the “semi-
innocent” agent, which applies when perpetrators actions are considered not fully voluntary, but 
not to the extent that it would absolve them of criminal responsibility; they can be characterized 
as having “caused” to the extent that they did not possess the complete knowledge necessary to 
fully comprehend the nature or circumstances of their conduct.86 The mens rea of the direct 
perpetrator therefore must be judged in terms of the secondary party’s mental state, and will 
require intent or knowledge.87 This can also apply to AWS, as their code gives them the ability to 
perform some decision-making capabilities, and therefore be able to comprehend certain 
elements of their actions. However, ultimately, their actions are limited by a human agent, who 
sets parameters for how they are able to act. Therefore, responsibility can be shared by both the 
AWS and another human counterpart who is involved in its behaviours and actions.  
Responsibility does not only occur when the act happens, but rather can be attributed at 
any time throughout the operation. According to specialist in the ethics of artificial intelligence 
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and autonomous systems Johannes Himmelrich, responsibility can be forward-looking and 
backward-looking.88 Forward-looking responsibility refers to “obligations to manage risks, 
perform certain actions, or produce certain outcomes.”89 This encompasses the obligations under 
IHL and the LOAC laid out above, in that actors are held responsible for complying with these 
principles and norms. For example, under this concept of forward-thinking responsibility, a 
military commander is responsible for ensuring that all systems are functioning properly in an 
AWS before deploying it, and programming it with the parameters necessary to ensure the 
intended military objective is met. Backward-looking responsibility refers to “what an agent 
acquires because of what she has done or brought about that grounds permission of other agents 
to react to this agent in certain ways.”90 In other words, the actor can be held responsible for their 
the results of their actions after they have been committed. For example, if an AWS harms an 
innocent civilian during their mission, then it and/or someone connected to the machine’s actions 
must be held responsible for the harm done to that civilian.  
This backward-looking responsibility is the most common way of thinking about 
responsibility, and presents a more holistic approach to attributing responsibility for an 
unintended result. Himmelreich explains that when an agent is responsible in this backward-
looking sense, then others are justified in holding them responsible in terms of attributability, 
accountability and answerability.91 In terms of attributability, responsibility is determined by 
express or constitute judgement of a person’s action and of the person themselves.92 In other 
words, responsibility is attributed to someone based on the judgement of an official legal body. 
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Thus, attribution of responsibility is determined in an ununiform and case-by-case basis 
depending on the facts of the case and the judgement of those proceeding over the case. In terms 
of accountability, responsibility is determined by justifying taking a “certain stance towards this 
person and forming evaluative or emotive attitudes, such as blame, praise, or resentment, as a 
part of this stance.”93 This means that accountability is determined through both qualitative 
analysis and emotional response; for example, to hold someone accountable for the harm caused 
by an AWS, it must be determined that the person was involved in process of that harm 
occurring, such as programming the system or determining the operation parameters, and can 
attribute blame to that person’s fault. Himmelreich, however, argues that responsibility need not 
always involve accountability and blameworthiness, but rather involve that an agent by 
answerable for their actions and apologize for the harms that ensued.94 Answerability can be 
determined by assessing and questioning the reasons the agent took in justifying their actions in 
order to justify the attitudinal stances taken.95 This aspect of responsibility becomes more 
muddied with AWS, as with their complex systems, it is hard to accurately determine its 
decision-making process and therefore make it difficult, if not impossible, to assess the reasoning 
or justification for its actions. However, determining answerability for AWS can take a different 
approach by assessing the initial code written by the developer, or the reasoning for deploying 
the AWS in the way that it was with the guidance or military objectives it received. Although 
this may not be able to specifically determine the reasons for the actions taken by the AWS, it 
will give a better idea of the decision-making process and reasoning by understanding the pre-
determined parameters within which it was operating.  
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To bring it back to forward-looking responsibility, liability can be attributed based on 
whether an actor failed to take precautions in order to ensure compliance with IHL and the 
LOAC. Boothby presents that there is no liability for “the damage lawfully done to military 
objectives, for the death or injury lawfully caused to members of the opposing armed forces, for 
expected death, injury or damage to civilians or civilian objects which is not excessive in relation 
to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage, or for the death or injury of civilians or 
damage to civilian objects caused by mistaken or erroneous attacks caused, for example, by the 
malfunction of military equipment.”96 In other words, since these actions are considered lawful 
under the principles of distinction and proportionality, as well as other principles codified in law, 
the agent who caused these effects will not be held liable for them. Liability, therefore, rests in 
damage caused by the failure to take all feasible precautions in relation to the attack operation 
which results in disobeying the law.97 For example, excessive harm to civilians caused by an 
AWS that failed to complete all necessary proportionality calculations is liable for that harm, 
since it did not take all feasible precautions by not completing all of the calculations. This could 
occur because of a developer not programming all the possible calculations into the AWS’s 
software, or the military commander not providing the appropriate parameters or information 
needed to perform the tasks.  
  With AWS, there exists that problem of responsibility gaps in determining liability and 
responsibility, as it becomes difficult to attribute individual responsibility to the actions of an 
AWS due to the nature of its programming and operation. Himmelreich explains that 
responsibility gaps occur when an AWS harms someone but there is no one responsible for that 
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harm.98 He goes on to explain that these responsibility gaps seem to only occur when minimal 
agents that have intentional agency but not moral agency are used in conflicts; they have 
intentional agency in the sense that they can form beliefs, decision and actions but they cannot be 
responsible for those actions without that moral agency.99 An agent has moral agency if their 
actions originate within themselves and reflect their end, which must come from their capacity to 
reason on the basis of their past experiences, and this end must have been chosen by 
themselves.100 Therefore, an AWS does not have moral agency because even though their actions 
do originate within themselves from their coding and software, their software was written and 
determined by someone else, and their end was, to an extent, chosen by someone else who 
decided their military objectives. Sartor and Omicini build on this by articulating that the 
deployment of AWS could determine responsibility and liability gaps due to their impossibility 
to attribute moral responsibility and legal liabilities to anyone based on harms caused by the 
AWS’s autonomous operation.101 Since their autonomous operation causes a diminishing 
influence of their human operators and developers, this creates a responsibility gap in that these 
humans can be considered too far removed from the actions of the AWS to be held responsible 
for those actions.  
 The idea of attributing responsibility to AWS can been compared to the use of child 
soldiers in war. Sparrow explains that while children can be argued to lack full moral authority, 
they are autonomous and are capable of acting and making decisions on their own, just like 
AWS.102 He argues that they are not appropriate objects of punishment, as they are not capable 
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of fully understanding the moral dimensions of what they are doing and therefore understanding 
their crime and punishment.103 However, the limited autonomy that these child soldiers do have 
is enough to ensure that those who order them into doing those actions do not control them, 
which makes attributing responsibility problematic.104 Sparrow explores a space where these 
children are sufficiently autonomous to make it difficult to attribute responsibility to appropriate 
adults, but not autonomous enough to be responsible for their own actions, and argues that it 
should be the person who placed them in the position where they played the causal role who 
should be held responsible.105 Analogous with this example, AWS have the ability to act on their 
own without immediate control, but these actions are pre-determined based on their coding and 
the military objectives delivered to them. Therefore, the person who is held responsible can be 
the person who developed the weapon and pre-determined its capabilities, or the commander 
who deployed it and delivered its military objectives, as they were the ones involved in guiding 
their actions.  
The developers 
 Responsibility for the actions of an AWS can lie with the developer of that weapon, as 
the design of the weapon contributes to its ability to perform tasks, and therefore the developer 
plays a crucial role in determining the actions of an AWS. Although it is rarely an individual 
who is solely in charge of developing, designing and programming the weapon, but rather more 
likely a team who works together for a technological corporation, for the purposes of this paper, 
developer will be used as a shorthand in explaining this responsibility attribution. The phases in t 
the lifetime of a new weapon include concept, assessment, development, manufacture, in-service 
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and disposal.106 This means that for a significant portion of the lifecycle of the AWS, the 
developers are involved and in charge of determining how it is programmed, designed and 
developed. Michael Schmitt argues that since a human, or rather team of humans, must decide 
how to program a system, they would be accountable for programming it to engage in actions 
that could amount to war crimes.107 Though he does argue that it is (hopefully) improbable that 
the developers would design an AWS to commit war crimes, he explains that it would be much 
more likely that a system that has not been programmed to do so is used in a manner that 
constitutes a war crime.108 In this case, it could be argued that the developers be held responsible 
for that war crime if the AWS is unable to discriminate between a combatant and non-combatant 
due to the programming of its sensors.  Sartor and Omicini also contribute to this debate, stating 
that developers will be considered blameworthy when they “negligently or intentionally 
contribute to delivering a device that either (a) would not achieve the intended function, or (b) 
would achieve the intended function, but this function necessarily entails unacceptable 
consequences.”109 Therefore, responsibility can be placed on developers that did not equip the 
AWS with, for example, sensors and software that is capable of discriminating at the level 
required for the intended task for harm caused to innocent civilians due to this error.110 The 
developers are directly involved in determining the capabilities of the AWS, and therefore have a 
role in their actions and decision-making.  
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 Developers play a role in the actions of AWS, and therefore can be responsible for them, 
as their capacity to cause harm is a direct result of its design.111 Tim McFarland and Tim 
McCormack, authors of “Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous Weapons Systems Be 
Liable for War Crimes,” argue that the developers exert greater control over the range of actions 
of the AWS and the specific actions it performs after its been deployed than the analogous 
relationship between combatant and commander, and therefore responsibility for the proscribed 
acts committed by an AWS can be more easily ascribed to the former relationship than the 
latter.112 This is because these actions are pre-determined by the programming and design of the 
AWS that the developers created. However, McFarland and McCormack go on to argue that to 
the extent that weapon developers may be considered instigators of an action by an AWS, they 
do so through control software, and the degree of control exercised by the developers depends on 
the degree of autonomy of the AWS with respect to the action.113 In other words, as the degree of 
autonomy increases – as in the less control an operator or commander has – the greater the share 
of control the developers have over the behaviour of the AWS. Therefore, as long as the operator 
of the AWS remains fully or partially connected to the operation of the weapon, the control is 
shared between the developers and the operator in terms of the actions conducted.114 There may 
be points during a conflict in which developers occupy control over the actions of a system such 
that soldiers and commanders may be excluded and are unable to instigate or intervene in the 
actions of the AWS.115 Thus, the developers are considered the primary determinants of the 
AWS’s actions and behaviour, as they are the ones who program those capabilities.   
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Due to the nature of the relationship between developers and AWS, the developers can be 
held liable for the actions of their weapons as they determine what actions they are able to 
conduct. McFarland and McCormack look at how mens rea requirements could be ground for 
developers to be held liable, particularly within the definition given above regarding aiding and 
abetting.116 They bring up the concept that in order for a person or persons to be held criminally 
responsible, they must have committed the act in question with intent and knowledge, on the 
basis that intent exists “when a person means to engage in conduct or cause a consequence, and 
knowledge refers to awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the 
ordinary course of events.”117 This means that the person or persons must have had full 
knowledge of the circumstances under which the action happened, and intended for the action to 
happen. However, McFarland and McCormack use the example of a judgement made in the Trial 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the trial of 
Anto Furundžija.118 The judgement noted that “it is not necessary that the aider and abettor 
should know the precise crime that was intended and which in the event was committed. If he is 
aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in 
fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an 
aider and abettor.”119 In other words, developers do not need to have been involved in the 
specific plans to commit the crime or intend for that specific crime to occur, but rather have 
programmed behaviours into the AWS that would be capable of committing criminal acts.120 For 
example, developers that knowingly programmed sensors that were not entirely accurate in 
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detecting a target, or had limitations in certain circumstances, would be held responsible for an 
AWS killing an innocent civilian because they were unable to distinguish between targets. 
However, a prosecutor would need to demonstrate that these developers understood that the 
weapon was capable of behaving in an illegal manner in order to be held liable.121 For example, 
if an AWS was placed in an environment that its developers had not anticipated it to operate in, 
and therefore its programming is not equipped to confidently and compliantly operate within that 
environment, and there is a crime committed, this could absolve developers of liability as they 
did not understand that the weapon could behave illegally as they did not understand how the 
AWS would operate in this foreign environment.  
 There are different ways that these system limitations can come about that can produce 
different levels of responsibility ascribed to developers. Robert Sparrow argues that fault could 
lie with the person or persons who designed and/or programmed the AWS if the fault was a 
result of negligence on the part of the design and/or programming team.122 In other words, fault 
could be attributed to the developers if did not properly take all steps necessary to ensure that the 
AWS was designed and/or programmed in a way that allowed it to function the way it was 
intended without undue errors. He does argue, however, that this need not necessarily be the 
case. He explores the possibility that the machine may attack the wrong targets due to an 
acknowledged limitation of the system, and therefore if the manufacturers of the weapon have 
made it clear to those who purchased or deployed the AWS, then they cannot be held 
responsible.123 Using the example presented earlier, developers who know that an AWS is unable 
to reliably detect targets in certain environments must tell the purchaser or deployer of the 
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weapon that it should not be operated in those environments, as it has the possibility of 
distinction error. Additionally, the connection between the programmers and the results of the 
system which would attribute responsibility to them is broken as the system becomes more 
autonomous.124 This is because as an AWS becomes more autonomous, the possibility that the 
AWS will make a choice other than those predicted by its programmers and designers increases 
as well.125 In other words, the developers become less responsible for the actions of an AWS as 
they become more autonomous, as they are less likely to accurately predict its actions with 
greater autonomy. Sparrow likens this to the relationship between a parent and child, making the 
analogy that just as a parent is not responsible for the actions of their child after they have left 
their care, programmers should not be responsible for the actions of their AWS after they have 
“left”.126 The responsibility for the actions of an AWS attributed to developers becomes more 
distant as those actions become further outside of the control of the developers if they are 
deployed to operate outside of their operational limits, and as their degree of autonomy increases, 
as both of these instances have the possibility to cause unpredictable effects.  
 Degrees of autonomy will influence the role of developers in terms of attributing 
responsibility to them. Matthias builds on the idea of growing autonomy shifting the role of 
developers in terms of responsibility for their “creation”.127 With increased techniques of 
artificial intelligence programming being developed for these AWS, the developers’ role 
becomes more distant as their code becomes more ambiguous, making it more difficult to isolate 
and identify errors in the decision-making process of the AWS.128 Since this programming uses 
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predicate logic that is not executed in the same linear fashion, but rather runs deductions though 
inference rules, the flow of control in these systems is more difficult to describe.129 However, as 
long as there is symbolic representation of the facts and rules involved in these deductions, there 
are methods of checking the stored information to ensure that it is correct.130 Therefore, as long 
as there is a way to assess how the decision-making process was made, and how the information 
was gathered and interpreted by the AWS, developers can be held responsible for those actions if 
they are found to be at fault in terms of how they programmed the system.  
In AWS with greater levels of autonomy, the representation of information becomes even 
more abstract and difficult to isolate and interpreted. The symbolic representation of this 
information and flow control disappears and is replaced with a matrix of synaptic weights, which 
cannot be interpreted directly and, therefore, any information stored in this network can only be 
inferred indirectly through experimentation.131 This makes it incredibly difficult to ensure 
predictability, as the network is constantly changing.132 Thus, this constantly changing network 
makes it impossible for the developers of the system to eliminate errors, but rather forces them to 
permit these errors so the system can learn and improve its operational performance.133 Even 
with developers defining the operational parameters of the system, as well as define the alphabet 
used and the semantics of its symbols, the system they create programs itself through this genetic 
programming inherent in this autonomous network.134 This makes the AWS work essentially 
outside of the observation of the developers, who is rendered unable to intervene manually.135 
Due to the nature of these increasingly autonomous networks, it becomes harder to attribute 
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responsibility to the developers, as they could not predict the actions of the AWS even though 
they were the ones who programmed them. With this increased ability to self-learn, AWS 
become more independent from their “creators”, and therefore can be considered acting on their 
own outside of the realm of control of their developers.  
Although responsibility can be diminished, it cannot be entirely removed from the 
developers. Hin-Yan Liu is a legal scholar focusing in artificial intelligence and its legal 
disruption, who explains how the complexity of the software can lead to the diminishing 
influence of the developers on the AWS’s behaviour and conduct.136 He explains that though the 
developers are able to program constraints to AWS behaviour, these constraints are likely to be 
quite broad and abstract, and therefore will allow the AWS to act in a way that could be difficult 
to predict given the range and complexity of the programming.137 He argues that because of this, 
the obstacles of attributing responsibility regarding AWS are issues of control, predictability and 
foreseeability, which ultimately work together to determine the manner in which the AWS are 
developed and deployed.138 Therefore, responsibility is determined by the circumstances under 
which the AWS is used, and determining the distribution of this responsibility is based on the 
level of control, predictability and foreseeability each actor has in the situation.139 Liu illustrates 
this disconnection in responsibility through exploring the individual roles of a developer or 
commander of an AWS.140 The individual or individuals are responsible for fulfilling their 
expectations and obligations that attach to their function of the AWS, and when they have 
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fulfilled these obligations, they are deemed to have acted responsibly.141 For example, if the 
developers have fulfilled their obligations to program the AWS to the best of their ability with 
the appropriate constraints and notify the commander of the limitations of its designs, they are 
deemed to have acted responsibly. However, Liu points out that AWS behaviour also depends on 
the commander who deploys it, and therefore this facilitates the displacement of blame from the 
programmer to the commander.142 This is because the programmer can argue that they had 
discharged their obligations by implementing the general parameters, and therefore the unlawful 
system behaviour is the responsibility of the commander who failed to complement those 
parameters with more specific constraints in the AWS’s deployment.143 In other words, if the 
developers outline the parameters and limitations of the AWS to the commander, but they fail to 
work within them causing harm to occur, then the developers cannot be held responsible for 
those actions, as it was the commander who failed to deploy the AWS in the right circumstances. 
Thus, it is important to explore the role and responsibility of military commanders regarding 
AWS.  
The military commander  
 The relationship between AWS and their military commander can be looked at as 
analogous to the relationship between commander and soldier. Heather Roff, a specialist in the 
law, policy and ethics of emerging technologies, explores this relationship through the doctrine 
of command responsibility.144 This doctrine allows for the claim that commanders can be held 
morally and legally responsible for the actions of their subordinates, and these commanders 
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“should have known” what would happen.145 In other words, a commander should have known 
the possible outcomes of a military operation or commands given to the soldiers. Therefore, if a 
commander gives their soldiers an unlawful order, then they should have known unlawful 
outcomes would occur and thus be held responsible for those outcomes. Command responsibility 
is therefore premised on the fact that a superior-subordinate relationship does exist, and that the 
test to see whether a person is a superior is one of “effective control.”146 Effective control 
exculpates superiors from prosecution where a “person who is formally a superior in the line of 
command may be excluded from criminal liability if that superior does not exercise actual 
control.”147 Looking at AWS, Roff argues that effective control would exculpate commanders 
from legal responsibility as they are unable to control the machines if they have a heightened 
amount of autonomy.148 Similarly as with developers, as the level of autonomy increases in an 
AWS, the level of control decreases for military commanders as the actions of the machine are 
less predictable and foreseeable. Additionally, she states that AWS are “impossible” to control 
“by a human in real-time due to its processing speed and the multitude of operational variables 
involved,” and therefore there is no way for a commander to prevent or punish a violation of jus 
in bello by said AWS.149 In other words, since the AWS is a self-regulatory system, it becomes 
difficult for commanders to exercise control over them and therefore cannot be responsible for 
the actions of the AWS. She continues by explaining that there can be no prevention of action as 
there can be no foresight of the actions the AWS will take, and therefore can be no punishment 
ascribed to the military commander.150 Though she does acknowledge that some responsibility 
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can be attributed to commanders, as they made the decision to deploy the AWS, she argues that 
this level of moral responsibility is relatively low.151 Therefore, the level of responsibility for 
military commanders for the actions of an AWS becomes quite limited as their level autonomy 
increases and diminishes the commander’s control over those actions.  
 Command responsibility and control can occur to varying degrees between a superior and 
their subordinates. Himmelreich builds on the idea of control, and the differing degrees of 
control that can exist between a commander and a subordinate.152 One way of understanding 
control that he proposes is Robust Tracking Control, which outlines that an agent has control 
over an outcome if that agent gave an order such that the outcome would occur in all relatively 
similar circumstances.153 Conversely, if that agent did not give that order, the outcome would not 
occur in all relatively similar circumstances.154 Robust tracking control also takes into account 
errors and that control need not be perfect; it allows for risky actions in that the outcomes can 
represent disjunctive descriptions and therefore the outcomes can include consequences that are 
unintended.155 Therefore, this type of control can be attributed to commanders and the AWS they 
deploy, in that if a commander deploys an AWS with the order to kill a specific target, it will do 
so if all circumstances and parameters are appropriate for that outcome to occur, and it will occur 
in similar situations. Since the AWS is unable to act in any way until they are activated, this 
becomes the central decision of the commander and therefore places responsibility on the 
commander to engage the AWS in any action.156 This means that the commander is responsible 
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for the outcomes of the AWS as those outcomes would not have occurred had the order not been 
given.  
To illustrate this concept, Himmelreich provides an example regarding AWS and their 
commanders. He provides a scenario in which a commander orders an AWS to patrol a large 
region and engage legitimate targets.157 During the mission, communication is not maintained, 
and the AWS identifies a potential target, which can only be engaged immediately.158 The AWS 
takes the target to be legitimate and engages it, and the target turns out to be a legitimate 
target.159 In this example, the commander does not have control over the actions of the AWS. 
However, this is not because this particular target would be bombed if the commander were to 
give the order, but rather because there is plausibility that in similar situations where the 
commander gave the order, the AWS decides against the bombing of the particular target in 
favour of bombing another.160 In this case, the commander is not responsible because this 
particular bombing does not track control order, but at the least, the commander still has control 
over whether or not they give an order.161 In other words, even though the commander has no 
control over any of the particular bombings, they do have control over whether some targets 
might be bombed.162 In this scenario, the commander would be held liable, but not directly 
responsible, for the actions of the AWS. Himmelreich, therefore, presents two outcomes that 
may arise from the deployment of this AWS: Outcome A, which states that this particular target 
is bombed; and Outcome B, which states that some target is bombed or no target is bombed.163 
He explains that outcome A represents a possible world where the AWS is deployed and the 
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particular target is bombed; this represents the particular outcome.164 Outcome B, on the other 
hand, is a probabilistic outcome, which represents a possible world where the AWS is deployed 
and some target is bombed.165 In this world, if the commander were to give the order, then some 
targets might be bombed; if the commander were not to give the order, no targets would be 
bombed.166 Himmelreich argues that, within this context and with regards to the condition that 
responsibility requires control, outcome B would render the commander responsible.167 Since the 
commander has a certain level of control in deploying the AWS, knowing that there is the 
possibility that a target other than the particular target may be bombed, that commander is 
responsible for the actions of the AWS because if the order had not been given, no bombings 
would occur at all. The decision to deploy the weapon, therefore, constitutes control and ascribes 
responsibility to the commander.  
The decision to deploy an AWS into the battlefield will ascribe responsibility for the 
actions after deployment to the military commander that ordered it. Sparrow argues that by 
making the decision to send the AWS into the battlefield, the commander is accepting the risk 
that it might go awry.168 In other words, if is the case that the autonomy of the AWS rests on the 
fact that its actions are not always reliably predictable and thus may cause unwanted deaths, then 
the commander who deployed the weapon is held responsible for those unwanted deaths as they 
understood that the weapon had the potential to kill people other than the intended target.169 
However, he acknowledges that AWS have the capacity to choose their own targets, and 
therefore with greater autonomy becomes less confidence in their reliability to attack the 
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intended target.170 Thus, using the unpredictability of a system as the only aspect of autonomy is 
incomplete; the use of AWS involves a risk that military personnel will be half responsible for, 
even though they did not control its decisions, as autonomy refers to the machine’s ability to 
determine its own actions.171 In other words, the military personnel would be responsible for 
acknowledging and accepting the risk of deploying the AWS, as their actions can be 
unpredictable, but are not directly responsible for their actions, as AWS have the capability to 
determine their own actions. In this relationship, it is therefore necessary that there is a sort of 
cooperation between the commander and the AWS, as the commander has the cognitive 
understanding of the machine’s capabilities and monitor its progress towards the military 
objective, similarly to a “human-like” sense of teamwork.172 Sparrow, therefore, accepts the 
analogy of child soldiers (which was explored earlier) to better understand how to determine 
responsibility. As with child soldiers, the possible solution to the responsibility gap identified in 
this relationship is assigning responsibility to the military commander who issued the attack 
order, but acknowledges that this solution may hold the commander responsible for things out of 
their control and therefore leaves open the possibility that they be punished unfairly.173 Under 
this analogy, a military commander could be held responsible for all actions of the AWS after its 
deployment, which could ascribe more blame and fault than reasonable to the military 
commander, as the actions of the AWS are not directly controlled by the commander but rather 
merely influenced by the order to attack.  
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Continuing with the analogy of the superior-subordinate relationship between soldiers 
and their commanders, the relationship between AWS and their commanders can be analyzed in 
a similar way. Jack McDonald, author of “Autonomous Agents and Command Responsibility,” 
argues that military organizations have a “top-down” compliance structure.174 This means that 
this structural compliance places constraints on individual autonomy and enables them to act 
based on information passed on to them by others who are higher ranked.175 In terms of AWS, 
this means that the actions that the weapons take are directly influenced and partially determined 
by the commanders who set the parameters of their military operation. Aiden Warren and Alek 
Hillas, authors of “Friend or frenemy? The role of trust in human-machine teaming and lethal 
autonomous weapons systems,” follow this line of reasoning by arguing that the successful 
adoption of AWS will depend on the direction of military commanders and will be reliant on 
effective human-machine teaming to be reliable and perform correctly.176 They argue that this 
relationship between humans and machines is necessary for the proper employment of AWS, and 
therefore they are interconnected in terms of the actions that occur.177 In other words, these 
humans will be held responsible for the actions of the AWS they operate because they are 
directly in charge of ensuring the proper and reliable operation of the AWS before deployment 
and during its mission. However, Sharkey argues that this human commander must have “full 
contextual and situational awareness of the target area at the time of a specific attack and be able 
to perceive and react to any change or anticipated situations that may have arisen since planning 
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the attack.”178 In other words, the commander must be entirely aware of the circumstances of the 
operation during the attack to the extent that they are able to intervene if need be. Therefore, the 
military commander must always be monitoring the AWS and have the capability to intervene 
during its mission in order to effectively be responsible for its actions. Kalmanovitz continues 
this idea by arguing that military commanders must be confident that they have taken all 
reasonable steps to adhere to the principles of distinction and proportionality, for which they 
have a legal duty to do.179 He argues that if, for example, a commander is unable to anticipate the 
range of action and corresponding risk with sufficient confidence, then it would be wrong to field 
the weapon and possibly a case of criminal negligence, and therefore the commander who 
fielded the weapon would be held criminally responsible for any mistakes that the AWS 
makes.180 Military commanders are accountable for the deployment of the AWS as it is a 
deliberate decision, and therefore any actions taken by the AWS after deployment directly stem 
from that decision.181 Military commanders can therefore be considered linked to the AWS that 
they deploy, making them responsible for their actions under their control and supervision.  
Autonomy plays a large role in defining the superior-subordinate relationship in terms of 
attributing responsibility. Corn elaborates on this relationship by linking command, LOAC 
compliance and lawful combatant status together, explaining that under the law only individuals 
who are capable of autonomous reasoning that are incorporated into the military organization 
capable of managing that reasoning should be allowed to engage in hostilities.182 He explains 
that the law establishes a high degree of confidence that an “autonomous human” will not use the 
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power entrusted in them in an unconstrained manner, but rather exercise that autonomy within 
the boundaries that their superior imposed on them to ensure legal compliance.183 In terms of 
AWS, those constraints are pre-determined for them through their programming, and therefore 
commanders are able to more confidently ensure legal compliance as these constraints are more 
strictly binding to machines than human soldiers. However, this superior-subordinate 
relationship obviously is not entirely analogous for AWS. For the soldier, training prior to being 
put into the battlefield lays a foundation for the ongoing process of framing the exercise of 
cognitive reasoning and independent judgement, and the military commander builds upon this 
foundation by exercising their responsibility to develop the soldier through continued training.184 
Therefore, the development of an AWS becomes more crucial in determining its behaviour on 
the battlefield, and creates an analogous counterpart to this training stage. However, Corn argues 
that military commanders will not have a meaningful opportunity to influence the judgement and 
reasoning of truly autonomous weapons, but rather deploy the weapons when a situation allows 
that the capabilities of the particular AWS will produce the desired result.185 Therefore, the 
military commander the military commander will have to have faith that the weapon has the 
capacity to exercise the necessary cognitive judgement to comply with the LOAC.186 Thus, this 
initial development phase is the decisive point in establishing parameters to ensure that the 
cognitive functions of the AWS only are exercised within these parameters in order to comply 
with the LOAC, as well as the military objectives and interests of the force.187 In other words, the 
military commander must be able to work within the parameters of the AWS’s capabilities and 
                                                 
183 Ibid, 222.  
184 Ibid, 222.  
185 Ibid, 223.  
186 Ibid, 224.  
187 Ibid, 224.  
 44 
deploy the weapon when they are confident that the circumstances under which it is deployed 
will allow it to comply with the LOAC and produce the intended military objective. They are, 
therefore, responsible for the actions of the AWS even though they are not directly involved in 
determining its capabilities and judgement.  
Command responsibility can be explained through two legal theories of criminal liability: 
traditional accomplice liability and “should-have-known” command responsibility theory.188 
Traditional accomplice liability is attributed when a commander shares the criminal intent and 
acts in a way that contributes to or facilitates a violation of the LOAC through a subordinate.189 
In other words, the commander knowingly deployed the AWS into a situation it was not 
adequately equipped to operate within with the intent to cause undue harm to civilians, and 
therefore would be held responsible for that harm. The “should-have-known” theory attributes 
liability to a commander for foreseeable LOAC violations that are committed by their 
subordinates, even when there is no proof that the commander shared the intent with the 
subordinate, because the commanders are responsible for violations that they “should have 
known” would occur.190 For example, the commander deploys an AWS in a situation that it was 
not adequately equipped to operate within, but did not intend for undue harm to happen, but 
should have known that this undue harm was a possibility in the circumstances under which the 
AWS was deployed. Not all technology is neutral, and some have properties that make some 
tasks easier to do than others; for example, some AWS may have constraints that make it easier 
for them to operate in some environments over others.191 Therefore, even though the commander 
                                                 
188 Ibid, 233.  
189 Ibid, 233.  
190 Ibid, 233.  
191 Malachy Eaton, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems," In Computers, People, and Thought: From Data 
Mining to Evolutionary Robotics (Limerick: Springer, 2020): 194.  
 45 
did not intend to cause the harm, they are still responsible for the actions that occurred as they 
“should have known” the AWS was unable to operate accurately in these environments and 
should have foreseen the possible LOAC violations. This theory provides that it is the 
responsibility of the military commanders to ensure that any AWS that is deployed is reliable 
and performs its capabilities in the ways expected of it.192 Corn sums up the idea of command 
responsibility by stating that the concept of “mission command” is central to the planning and 
execution of military operations, and is premised on the expectation that subordinates advance 
the commander’s intent.193 In other words, the orders of the military commander directly dictate 
the subordinates’ actions and therefore they follow through with the commander’s intent to 
perform actions in order to achieve the military objective. For AWS, this means that the military 
commander’s intent is advanced by the AWS as the commander gave the AWS the military 
objectives knowing its capabilities, and the AWS performed actions in order to follow through 
with those objectives.  
Command responsibility can be understood as direct or indirect responsibility. Jain 
explains that command responsibility is combination of direct and indirect responsibility in that 
the commander is held directly responsible for their own failure to supervise or interevent, and 
indirectly responsible for the criminal acts of their subordinates.194 She explains that the doctrine 
includes three common characteristics: the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship 
exists, there is a requisite mental element in that the superior knew or had reason to know of their 
subordinates’ crimes, and that superior had failed to control, prevent or punish the subordinates 
for those crimes.195 In other words, the commander should have had effective control over the 
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subordinate at the time of the act, and that commander should have had the ability to prevent that 
act.196 In terms of AWS, this doctrine would require that the military commander had control 
over the AWS, through deployment and monitoring, during the criminal act, and had the ability 
to intervene or abort the mission to prevent the act from happening. Regarding the mental 
element, Article 28 of the Rome Statute states that a “should have known” or negligence 
standard suffices for criminal liability.197 Article 28(1) also requires a causal connection between 
the crimes committed by subordinates and the superior’s culpability, and therefore the superior’s 
omission could have facilitated or encouraged the crimes, or increased the risk of crime.198 In 
other words, if a commander deployed an AWS that was unable to appropriately function within 
the parameters and environment in which it was deployed, the commander could be held liable as 
they acted negligently. The duty to prevent exists when an offence is going to, or is about to, 
occur and could materialize due to a commander failing to account for factors in their 
subordinates that could give rise to the crime being committed.199 For AWS, this means that the 
military commander must be aware of any offence that may occur due to the design of the AWS, 
and by failing to account for the limitations in its d esign that caused the offence to occur, they 
are held responsible for that offence. Therefore, a military commander must understand, 
acknowledge and take into account the limitations of an AWS before deploying it to ensure that 
it is limiting the risk of potential criminal activity, and is responsible for the actions of that AWS 
that may occur due to these limitations.  
 There are, however, some issues that arise when attributing responsibility to the 
commander of an AWS. Liu argues that because the commander acts at a later stage than the 
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developer, the commander’s ability to set constraints for the AWS is limited by and contingent 
upon the constraints already implemented by the developer, and therefore this narrows the 
commander’s control over the AWS and limits their predictability over the system’s 
behaviour.200 Additionally, the replacement of a direct human operator of a weapons system by 
an artificial counterpart could disrupt the superior-subordinate relationship required, because the 
relationship has historically been an interpersonal one.201 Because of this, Liu argues that it 
would be impossible to use the doctrine of command responsibility for an AWS due to a lack of 
superior-subordinate relationship.202 Liu also explores the requirement of “effective control,” 
arguing that the powers that the commander has to influence, suppress or prevent behaviours of 
an AWS may be severely limited due to the technical parameters of the system, be contingent on 
the technical knowledge and capabilities of the commander, and be impractical due to the 
inability to meaningfully punish a machine.203 These considerations present obstacles in 
presenting effective control over an AWS, and therefore cause issues in attributing responsibility 
to the commander in charge of the AWS.204 Therefore, the relationship between AWS and their 
commanders becomes more distant in that the commander’s ability to effectively control and 
determine the AWS’s actions is limited by the design already pre-determined by the developer, 
and thus the responsibility would be shared between the two in terms of being in control of the 
AWS’s behaviours and actions.  
CONCLUSION 
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 With the rapid advancement of technology and the introduction of AWS into the 
battlefield, it has become increasingly more important to explore how these robots will fit within 
the international legal landscape. The current legal landscape, though not explicitly including 
AWS within their rules and regulations, provides clear guidelines with which to contextualize 
how AWS fit; through exploring their capabilities and matching them with principles of IHL and 
LOAC, we are able to identify how AWS are able to comply with these rules and consequently 
be deemed to have broken the law. For example, through the use of sensors, AWS are able to 
adhere to the principle of distinction by being able to identify between targets and non-targets.  
However, attributing responsibility and liability present a separate issue, as the requirements for 
each are rooted in common sense and reasonableness, which are coded as inherently human 
characteristics that require more abstract judgement that AWS are incapable of processing. 
Therefore, we explore vicarious liability that can be attributed to the AWS’s developers and their 
military commanders. Developers can be held responsible for the actions of AWS due to their 
role in programming the weapons capabilities and parameters. Although the role of the developer 
becomes more distant and diminished as the AWS operates in a more autonomous fashion, the 
capabilities of the AWS are still pre-determined by the software and programming that they were 
designed with, and therefore the developers are responsible for the actions made due to the 
information that was programmed into the system. Military commanders can be held responsible 
for the actions of AWS because they made the decision to deploy the weapon and determine its 
military objectives. Though they are working within the confines and constraints of the 
programming of the AWS, military commanders are still held responsible for the actions of the 
AWS as they made the orders to the machine knowing its capabilities and limitations, predicting 
the actions that could be taken to complete the military objectives, and therefore be held 
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responsible for those actions. However, one cannot be responsible and the other not; since both 
the developers and commanders are simultaneously involved with the behaviours and actions of 
the AWS, they can be held jointly responsible for the actions of the AWS. Both play a role in 
determining how the AWS will act and react in any given circumstance, and therefore both play 
a role in the final effects of the AWS. Though the autonomous nature of AWS provides the 
weapon itself with the ability to make its own decisions and take its own actions, it is ultimately 
the influence of the developers and commanders that dictate those actions and, consequently, 
their effects.  
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